Post by robeiae on Feb 2, 2021 19:09:32 GMT -5
The report: cdn.ymaws.com/counciloncj.org/resource/resmgr/covid_commission/Year_End_Crime_Update_Design.pdf
Key points:
30% increase, compared to 2019. That's...big. The fact that the rates aren't at historic highs seems like cold comfort.
The report wants to put a lot of this on the Covid pandemic, yet it allows this:
The city-specific increases are on page 19. The report says this, in that regard:
Here's an article on this at Reason: reason.com/volokh/2021/02/01/explaining-the-great-2020-homicide-spike/
It's pretty critical of the report's conclusions. It offers the following:
Key points:
+ This study examines crime rates for ten different offenses in 34 American cities
during the calendar year of 2020, with a special emphasis on homicide and other
violent crimes. The current study updates previous studies by the authors with
additional data through December 2020.
+ Homicides rose sharply in 2020, and rates of aggravated assaults and gun assaults
increased as well. Homicide rates were 30% higher than in 2019, an historic increase
representing 1,268 more deaths in the sample of 34 cities than the year before.
+ The large size of this increase is deeply troubling, but readers should be aware that
absolute rates of homicide remain well below historical highs. In 2020, the homicide
rate was 11.4 deaths per 100,000 residents in sample cities; 25 years earlier, in 1995,
the rate was 19.4 per 100,000 residents.
during the calendar year of 2020, with a special emphasis on homicide and other
violent crimes. The current study updates previous studies by the authors with
additional data through December 2020.
+ Homicides rose sharply in 2020, and rates of aggravated assaults and gun assaults
increased as well. Homicide rates were 30% higher than in 2019, an historic increase
representing 1,268 more deaths in the sample of 34 cities than the year before.
+ The large size of this increase is deeply troubling, but readers should be aware that
absolute rates of homicide remain well below historical highs. In 2020, the homicide
rate was 11.4 deaths per 100,000 residents in sample cities; 25 years earlier, in 1995,
the rate was 19.4 per 100,000 residents.
30% increase, compared to 2019. That's...big. The fact that the rates aren't at historic highs seems like cold comfort.
The report wants to put a lot of this on the Covid pandemic, yet it allows this:
Part One of this study updates previous reports for Arnold Ventures and the National
Commission on COVID-19 and Criminal Justice on crime changes during the coronavirus
pandemic. It reveals statistically significant changes in the rates of violent, property, and
drug offenses for a sample of American cities during calendar year 2020.
Homicide rates were higher during every month of 2020 relative to rates from the
previous year. That said, rates increased significantly in June, well after the pandemic
began, coinciding with the death of George Floyd and the mass protests that followed.
Overall, homicide rates increased 30% in 2020, a large and troubling increase that has no
modern precedent. An increase of this size in large cities suggests that the national
homicide rate increase almost certainly will exceed the 10.2% increase in 2016, after
police killings in Ferguson, MO and elsewhere sparked widespread protests, as well as
previous largest single-year increase of 12.7% in 1968.6 But, as other commentators have
noted, a final determination must await official crime statistics from the federal
government, which will be released later this year.
Commission on COVID-19 and Criminal Justice on crime changes during the coronavirus
pandemic. It reveals statistically significant changes in the rates of violent, property, and
drug offenses for a sample of American cities during calendar year 2020.
Homicide rates were higher during every month of 2020 relative to rates from the
previous year. That said, rates increased significantly in June, well after the pandemic
began, coinciding with the death of George Floyd and the mass protests that followed.
Overall, homicide rates increased 30% in 2020, a large and troubling increase that has no
modern precedent. An increase of this size in large cities suggests that the national
homicide rate increase almost certainly will exceed the 10.2% increase in 2016, after
police killings in Ferguson, MO and elsewhere sparked widespread protests, as well as
previous largest single-year increase of 12.7% in 1968.6 But, as other commentators have
noted, a final determination must await official crime statistics from the federal
government, which will be released later this year.
Figure 11 shows the 2019-2020 percentage change in the number of homicides in each of
the 34 cities in the sample. Most obviously and importantly, homicides rose in 29 of 34
(85%) of the cities included in the sample. Several of the greatest increases occurred in
smaller cities with very small homicide counts, where even a few additional homicides can
produce a large percentage change. For example, Chula Vista, California, experienced the
largest homicide increase in the sample (150%), but that percentage is based on a
difference of just six homicides (ten in 2020 compared with four in 2019). But large
increases in homicides were not limited to smaller cities. Chicago added 278 homicides to
its 2019 total of 502, for an increase of 55%. New York added 131 homicides,
representing a 43% increase. Not surprisingly, given their size, large cities with
appreciable homicide increases contributed disproportionately to the overall increase in
murder victims. The three largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago) accounted
for fully 40% of the 1,268 additional people killed in 2020. While there is variation among
the cities, what is most notable is that homicide rose substantially in the vast majority of
them.
the 34 cities in the sample. Most obviously and importantly, homicides rose in 29 of 34
(85%) of the cities included in the sample. Several of the greatest increases occurred in
smaller cities with very small homicide counts, where even a few additional homicides can
produce a large percentage change. For example, Chula Vista, California, experienced the
largest homicide increase in the sample (150%), but that percentage is based on a
difference of just six homicides (ten in 2020 compared with four in 2019). But large
increases in homicides were not limited to smaller cities. Chicago added 278 homicides to
its 2019 total of 502, for an increase of 55%. New York added 131 homicides,
representing a 43% increase. Not surprisingly, given their size, large cities with
appreciable homicide increases contributed disproportionately to the overall increase in
murder victims. The three largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago) accounted
for fully 40% of the 1,268 additional people killed in 2020. While there is variation among
the cities, what is most notable is that homicide rose substantially in the vast majority of
them.
Here's an article on this at Reason: reason.com/volokh/2021/02/01/explaining-the-great-2020-homicide-spike/
It's pretty critical of the report's conclusions. It offers the following:
To my mind, the major flaw in today's Rosenfeld report is its concluding section, which makes policy recommendations. The section calls for "bold action" to respond to rising homicide rates, But rather than presenting a bold response, the reports offers three anodyne recommendations–recommendations that unfortunately seem to steer clear of directly addressing de-policing issues.
The first recommendation calls for "subduing the coronavirus pandemic." No one will disagree with that proposal. But for reasons explained above, the pandemic does not appear to be the main cause of the homicide spike and thus subduing it will not address most of the problem.
The Rosenfeld report's second recommendation is "improving the fairness and legitimacy of the justice system in general, and policing in particular." This is a good idea, to be sure. Indeed, I doubt anyone would disagree with improving the "legitimacy" of our criminal justice system in general. But, again, this proposal does not provide helpful guidance to policymakers seeking to respond immediately to the sharp increase in homicides that has manifested over the last seven months. Issues surrounding "legitimacy" of the system ebb and flow in long term cycles that seem unrelated to the current spike.
The final recommendation is that "responses to record-breaking increases in homicide must not wait. Policymakers can and should address the pandemic, police legitimacy, and violent crime simultaneously. A large body of rigorous empirical evidence demonstrates that violent crime can be addressed using strategies that are available now and do not require significant budgetary outlays, new legislation, or deep systemic reforms." This recommendation is apparently based on a footnote to one of the co-authors on the Rosenfeld report–Thomas Abt, who has written an informative book, Bleeding Out. But that book, written in 2019 before the pandemic, offers a series of proposals designed to reduce homicides generally, such as by expanding social services and anti-violence programs. To be sure, preventing homicides is obviously a good thing. But general approaches obviously are not targeted to a specific problem that sudden arose during the last half of 2020. The Rosenfeld report fails to explain clearly what countermeasures would be effective in specifically combating the nation's recent homicide spike.
The first recommendation calls for "subduing the coronavirus pandemic." No one will disagree with that proposal. But for reasons explained above, the pandemic does not appear to be the main cause of the homicide spike and thus subduing it will not address most of the problem.
The Rosenfeld report's second recommendation is "improving the fairness and legitimacy of the justice system in general, and policing in particular." This is a good idea, to be sure. Indeed, I doubt anyone would disagree with improving the "legitimacy" of our criminal justice system in general. But, again, this proposal does not provide helpful guidance to policymakers seeking to respond immediately to the sharp increase in homicides that has manifested over the last seven months. Issues surrounding "legitimacy" of the system ebb and flow in long term cycles that seem unrelated to the current spike.
The final recommendation is that "responses to record-breaking increases in homicide must not wait. Policymakers can and should address the pandemic, police legitimacy, and violent crime simultaneously. A large body of rigorous empirical evidence demonstrates that violent crime can be addressed using strategies that are available now and do not require significant budgetary outlays, new legislation, or deep systemic reforms." This recommendation is apparently based on a footnote to one of the co-authors on the Rosenfeld report–Thomas Abt, who has written an informative book, Bleeding Out. But that book, written in 2019 before the pandemic, offers a series of proposals designed to reduce homicides generally, such as by expanding social services and anti-violence programs. To be sure, preventing homicides is obviously a good thing. But general approaches obviously are not targeted to a specific problem that sudden arose during the last half of 2020. The Rosenfeld report fails to explain clearly what countermeasures would be effective in specifically combating the nation's recent homicide spike.